ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THE JUDGE AND THE JUDICIARY BRANCH

Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier

Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier Universidade Regional do Noroeste do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (UNIJUI) http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1617-4270

Palavras-chave: artificial intelligence, due process of law, efficiency

Resumo

this article studies the extent to which intelligent machines can be used by the Judiciary, in view of principles related to the Democratic Rule of Law applicable to jurisdictional activity. Its hypothesis is that the use of AI tools has several advantages (among them, the performance in repetitive functions, which is necessary and important in the management of lawsuits, and related to the speed with which the demands are judged, and to the expenditure of human resources and materials for the performance of such function and the least possibility and occurrence of errors) — however, its current evolutionary stage still does not allow the replacement of human magistrates by intelligent machines, because the complexities and particularities of a dispute often exceed that which is achievable through the application of algorithms, requiring the performance of a human judge, with sensibilities, contextualization skills and the use of natural language that an AI does not have. As a main result, that hypothesis has been confirmed and, in addition, public policies for the application of AI in the Judiciary must be developed with caution, so that the risk of replacing justice with economical efficiency only does not materialize. Methodology: hypothetical-deductive procedure method, with a qualitative approach and bibliographic-documentary research technique.

Biografia do Autor

Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier, Universidade Regional do Noroeste do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (UNIJUI)

Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu (Mestrado e Doutorado) em Direito da Universidade Regional do Noroeste do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (UNIJUI). Doutor em Direito pela Unviersidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), com Pós-Doutorado em Direito e Teoria (Law and Theory) pela University of Westminster (Reino Unido).